Population Policy through Tradable Procreation Rights

David de la Croix and Axel Gosseries

No 420, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Tradable permits are now widely used to control pollution. We investigate the implications of setting up such a system in another field -- population control --, either domestically or at the global level. We first generalize the framework with both tradable procreation allowances and tradable procreation exemptions, in order to tackle both over- and under-population problems. The implications of procreation rights for income inequality and education are contrasted. With procreation exemptions or procreation allowances that would be expensive enough, resources are redistributed from the rich to the poor. In contrast, cheap procreation allowances redistribute resource towards the rich. As far as human capital is concerned, natalist policy would be bad for education, while population control would be good. If procreation rights are granted in proportion to existing fertility levels (grandfathering) instead of being allocated uniformly, population control can be made more redistributive. On the whole, procreation rights offer an interesting alternative to both coercive population control in developing countries and pronatalist policies in the developed world

Keywords: Tradable permits; Population control; Pronatalist policy; Income inequality; Differential fertility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 J13 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Population Policy through Tradable Procreation Entitlements (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed006:420

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().