Trade Costs, Limited Enforcement and Risk Sharing: A Joint Test
Doireann Fitzgerald
No 491, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Abstract:
This paper addresses the question of whether goods or asset market frictions are necessary to explain the failure of consumption risk sharing across countries. I present a multi-country DSGE model with Armington specialization. There are iceberg costs of shipping goods across countries. In asset markets, contracts are imperfectly enforceable. Both frictions separately limit the extent to which countries can pool risk. The model suggests a test for the presence of each of the two types of friction that can be implemented using data on bilateral imports. I implement this test using a sample of developed and developing countries. I find that both trade costs and asset market imperfections are necessary in order to explain the failure of perfect consumption risk sharing. However the null hypothesis of financial autarky is rejected
Keywords: risk sharing; trade costs; asset market frictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 F36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2006/paper_491.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed006:491
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().