Nearly Optimal Pricing for Multiproduct Firms

Chenghuan Sean Chu, Phillip Leslie and Alan Sorensen (asorensen@stanford.edu)
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Alan Sorensen: Graduate School of Business Stanford University

No 830, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We examine pricing strategies for a multiproduct monopolist. We show that simple quantity discounting strategies are almost as profitable as fully optimal bundling. We investigate this in an empirical example, using data from a theater company

Keywords: Bundling; Price Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Nearly Optimal Pricing for Multiproduct Firms (2008)
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