Sovereign Debt and the Tragedy of the Commons

Manuel Amador

No 1000, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: The paper presents a model of sovereign debt repayment based in a tragedy of the commons. It is shown that sovereign debt is issued and repaid in equilibrium, even when contracts a la Bulow-Rogoff are available to a country that defaults.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed007:1000

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