Sovereign Debt and the Tragedy of the Commons

Manuel Amador

No 1000, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: The paper presents a model of sovereign debt repayment based in a tragedy of the commons. It is shown that sovereign debt is issued and repaid in equilibrium, even when contracts a la Bulow-Rogoff are available to a country that defaults.

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2007/paper_1000.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed007:1000

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().