EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information

Chi Leung Wong and Artyom Shneyerov

No 1032, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study a steady state of the market with inflowing cohorts of buyers and sellers. The traders are randomly matched pairwise driven by a Pissarides-style matching function. Two bargaining protocols are considered: random offering and the k-double auction. There are frictions due to time discounting and costly participation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium with trade. Two types of equilibria are shown to exist: those in which each meeting results in a trade, and those in which some meetings do not. If the random-offering protocol is used, all equilibria converge at the linear rate to the Walrasian outcome as the frictions vanish. Under the k-double auction protocol, however, there also non-convergent equilibria.

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2007/paper_1032.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed007:1032

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().

 
Page updated 2021-01-24
Handle: RePEc:red:sed007:1032