Pricing in Matching Markets

Larry Samuelson, Andrew Postlewaite and George Mailath
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Larry Samuelson: University of Wisconsin

No 531, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study why different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We link these prices to differences in the premuneration values---the values in the absence of any payments (or muneration)---created by the buyer-seller match. The results point to a theory of designing markets to allow effective pricing.

Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Pricing in Matching Markets (2010)
Working Paper: Pricing in Matching Markets (2010)
Working Paper: Pricing in Matching Markets (2010)
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