When does it pay to get informed?

Ayça Kaya

No 572, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: I analyze a repeated principal-agent model where there is uncertainty about the technology of production and where the principal has the means to acquire information about this technology. I show that, even when information acquisition is costless, the principal may not wish to get informed. What drives this, is the fact that the principal is forced to engage in costly signaling after acquiring information, because the agent interprets no signaling as bad news.

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2007/paper_572.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: WHEN DOES IT PAY TO GET INFORMED? (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed007:572

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().