On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ?

Hubert Kempf () and Leopold von Thadden
Additional contact information
Leopold von Thadden: European Central Bank

No 801, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper offers a comprehensive framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature on policy interactions in monetary unions, we prove that games characterized by different commitment and cooperation schemes can have the same equilibrium if certain spillover effects vanish at the common equilibrium of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment and cooperation are non-trivial issues. Yet, models of the linear-quadratic variety with multiple policymakers can generate a `symbiotic' result where commitment and cooperation issues are irrelevant and where the unique equilibrium of any game is the bliss point. The proposed framework is sufficiently general to allow for a broad discussion of policymaking in monetary unions and policy interactions among nations.

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2007/paper_801.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter? (2008)
Working Paper: On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do Cooperation and Commitment Matter? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter ? (2008)
Working Paper: On policy interactions among nations: when do cooperation and commitment matter? (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed007:801

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().