Strategic Communication with Lying Costs

Navin Kartik

No 350, 2008 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: talk and verifiable disclosure games, unifying the orthogonal predictions they make under large conflicts of interest.

Date: 2008
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Journal Article: Strategic Communication with Lying Costs (2009)
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