Pacifying monogamy: the mystery revisited

Nils-Petter Lagerlof

No 383, 2008 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: It may thus serve a ruler’s reproductive interests to be subject to an institution which limits the number of wives he (or anyone who successfully ousts him) can take. Moreover, our model suggests how such marriage norms can arise endogenously in the course of economic development, as an optimal response to rising population levels.

Date: 2008
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