Equilibrium Effects of Education Policies: a Quantitative Evaluation

Giovanni L. Violante, Costas Meghir and Giovanni Gallipoli ()
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Giovanni L. Violante: New York University,CEPR,NBER

No 868, 2008 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: (they are crowded out). Thus the subsidy strongly acts on the composition of those in education. We find that subsidies made conditional on financial resources are generally preferable to those conditional on ability and large equilibrium effects can be induced by relatively small changes in marginal returns. We also evaluate the effects of changes in the relative burden of labor vis-a-vis capital taxes.

Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Education Policy and Intergenerational Transfers in Equilibrium (2013)
Working Paper: Education Decisions, Equilibrium Policies and Wages Dispersion (2005)
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