Equilibrium Effects of Education Policies: a Quantitative Evaluation
Giovanni L. Violante,
Costas Meghir () and
Giovanni Gallipoli ()
Additional contact information
Giovanni L. Violante: New York University,CEPR,NBER
No 868, 2008 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
(they are crowded out). Thus the subsidy strongly acts on the composition of those in education. We find that subsidies made conditional on financial resources are generally preferable to those conditional on ability and large equilibrium effects can be induced by relatively small changes in marginal returns. We also evaluate the effects of changes in the relative burden of labor vis-a-vis capital taxes.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Education Policy and Intergenerational Transfers in Equilibrium (2013)
Working Paper: Education Decisions, Equilibrium Policies and Wages Dispersion (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed008:868
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in 2008 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().