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Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information

Ying Chen

No 1159, 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: But when a policy dimension and a distributive dimension are both present, we show that in equilibrium, the demands by the legislators have some influence on the bargaining outcome but they are not fully informative about the legislators' true preferences. We characterize equilibria under the majority rule and show that equilibrium demands by the legislators can be either cooperative, compromising or tough.

Date: 2010
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Journal Article: Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (2010) Downloads
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More papers in 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
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