OptimalPatent Policy with Recurrent Innovators

Hugo Hopenhayn and Matthew Mitchell
Additional contact information
Hugo Hopenhayn: UCLA

No 1313, 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study an optimal patent problem in the spirit of Hopenhayn, et al (2006), but where all innovations arise from two repeated innovators. Following Hopenhayn, et al (2006) we divide patent regimes into those that are exclusive, in the sense that only one firm ever has a claim on the current market, and non-exclusive regimes where both firms simultaneously have ongoing claims to market leadership at a given instant. We show that in the exclusive regime, the long run treatment of the firms depends crucially on the investment technology: when it has no fixed costs, no firm is ever excluded, but with fixed costs one firm is excluded in finite time. We characterize non-exclusive regimes numerically and show that they may or may not lead to monopolization in the long run.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2010/paper_1313.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed010:1313

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().