An Incentive Theory of Matching

Dennis Snower, Christian Merkl and Alessio Brown
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Dennis Snower: Kiel Institute for the World Economy

No 439, 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We construct a theoretical model explaining two-sided selection through microeconomic incentives. Firms face adjustment costs in responding to heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs. Matches and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job acceptance and quit decisions. Our calibrated model for the U.S. can account for important empirical regularities that the conventional matching model cannot.

Date: 2010
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Related works:
Journal Article: AN INCENTIVE THEORY OF MATCHING (2015)
Working Paper: An Incentive Theory of Matching (2010)
Working Paper: An Incentive Theory of Matching (2009)
Working Paper: An Incentive Theory of Matching (2009)
Working Paper: An incentive theory of matching (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed010:439

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