International Protection of Intellectual Property: A Quantitative Assessment

Jeff Thurk

No 479, 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: IPR policies each period. I use country heterogeneity in education, population, and bilateral trade costs to induce IPR protection choices and firm productivity distributions consistent with the data. I compare the benchmark open economy model to a model without trade and find that the latter generates a similar rank-ordering of country IPR choices, but IPR choices decrease 2%, on average. I also show that imposing government commitment decreases IPR choices substantially. Finally, I ask who wins and who loses under a harmonized IPR standard? To answer this, I compare the benchmark model to a planner's solution where the planner chooses and commits to a single IPR policy for all countries. I find the planner's IPR policy is significantly lower than the benchmark US policy. Though average country welfare decreases, developed countries are largely better off.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2010/paper_479.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed010:479

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().