Trading Dynamics in Decentralized Markets with Adverse Selection

Benjamin Lester and Braz Camargo ()

No 488, 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study a dynamic, decentralized market environment with asymmetric information and interdependent values between buyers and sellers, and characterize the complete set of equilibria. The model delivers a stark relationship between the severity of the information frictions and the time it takes for the market to clear, or market liquidity. We use this framework to understand how asymmetric information has contributed to the "frozen" credit market at the core of the current financial crisis, and to characterize optimal policy responses to this market failure.

Date: 2010
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Related works:
Journal Article: Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection (2014)
Working Paper: Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection (2011)
Working Paper: Trading Dynamics in Decentralized Markets with Adverse Selection (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed010:488

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