Aspiration, Sympathy and Minmax Outcome

Akihiko Matsui and Inkoo Cho
Additional contact information
Akihiko Matsui: University of Tokyo

No 57, 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We focus on the outcomes sustained by the decision rule consistent with the satisficing behavior a la Simon [1987], slightly perturbed to incorporate sympathy in the spirit of Hume [1978]. For a general class of two person games, as the probability of continuing the long term relationship converges to 1, all agents in the economy almost always play the most egalitarian outcome among Pareto efficient outcome, which is the efficient Rawlsian outcome. The Rawlsian criterion is generated through repeated long term interactions among agents in a decentralized fashion.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2010/paper_57.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed010:57

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().