Inequality, Leverage and Crises

Romain Ranciere and Michael Kumhof

No 1374, 2011 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: The paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution. Empirically, the periods 1920-1929 and 1983-2007 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich, a large increase in leverage for the remainder, and an eventual financial and real crisis. The paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes. A financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction. But restoration of the lower income groupâs bargaining power is more effective.

Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Inequality, Leverage, and Crises (2015)
Working Paper: Inequality, Leverage, and Crises (2015)
Working Paper: Inequality, Leverage, and Crises (2015)
Working Paper: Inequality, Leverage and Crises (2011)
Working Paper: Inequality, Leverage and Crises (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed011:1374

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2011 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().