Unions in a Frictional Labor Market

Leena Rudanko and Per Krusell
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Leena Rudanko: Boston University

No 320, 2011 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We model a labor market with search and matching frictions where some or all workers belong to a (centralized) union, both in the case where coverage is exogenously given and where it is endogenous. Unions are assumed to choose identical wages for all unionized workers, and firms are assumed not to be able to discriminate with respect to union status in their hiring and firing policies. We characterize efficiency and unemployment outcomes for this economy.

Date: 2011
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Related works:
Journal Article: Unions in a frictional labor market (2016)
Working Paper: Unions in a frictional labor market (2016)
Working Paper: Unions in a Frictional Labor Market (2015)
Working Paper: Unions in a frictional labor market (2015)
Working Paper: Unions in a Frictional Labor Market (2012)
Working Paper: Unions in a Frictional Labor Market (2012)
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