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Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies

Manuel Amador and Mark Aguiar
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Mark Aguiar: University of Rochester

No 527, 2011 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy (SOE) with sovereign and private default risk. The SOE's government uses linear taxation to fund exogenous expenditures and uses public debt to inter-temporally allocate tax distortions. We characterize a class of environments in which the tax on labor goes to zero in the long run, while the tax on capital income may be non-zero,reversing the standard prediction of the Ramsey tax literature. The zero labor tax is an optimal long run outcome if the private agents are impatient relative to the international interest rate and the economy is subject to private and/or sovereign debt constraints. We show that a similar result holds in a closed economy with imperfect inter-generational altruism.

Date: 2011
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Related works:
Journal Article: Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies (2011) Downloads
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