New Results in Recursive Contract Theory

Ramon Marimon
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Ramon Marimon: European University Institute and UPF-BarcelonaGSE

No 752, 2011 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Presentation of some new results showing how, under very general conditions, the recursive saddle-point method, pioneered by Marcet and Marimon, delivers the appropriate solution for contracting problems with intertemporal incentive constraints, with or without unique solutions. These results summarize work from: Marimon and Marcet "Recursive Contracts" (2011) and Marimon, Messner and Pavoni "Solving Recursive Contracts with Non-unique Solutions" (2011), as well as from ongoing work with Jan Werner: "On the Envelope Theorem without Differentiability" (2010).

Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed011:752

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