First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics
Michael McMahon and
Stephen Hansen
No 1163, 2012 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Abstract:
We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasing confidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal their hawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns or pleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The paper suggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explaining dynamics in experts' policy choices.
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Journal Article: First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics (2016)
Working Paper: First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics (2013)
Working Paper: First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics (2012)
Working Paper: First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics (2011)
Working Paper: First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics (2011)
Working Paper: First impressions matter: signalling as a source of policy dynamics (2011)
Working Paper: First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed012:1163
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