Selection and Incentives: Optimal Taxation with Occupational Choice and Private Information
Stefania Albanesi ()
No 213, 2012 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
This paper examines optimal taxation of capital and labor income in a dynamic model with occupational choice.
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Working Paper: Selection and Incentives: Optimal Taxation with Occupational Choice and Private Information (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed012:213
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More papers in 2012 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
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