Optimal Long-term Contracting with Learning
Jianfeng Yu,
Bin Wei and
Zhiguo He ()
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Jianfeng Yu: University of Minnesota
No 221, 2012 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Abstract:
This paper introduces profitability uncertainty into an infinite-horizon variation of the classic Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) model, and studies optimal dynamic contracting with endogenous learning. The agent's potential belief manipulation leads to the hidden information problem, which makes incentive provisions intertemporally linked in the optimal contract. We reduce the contracting problem into a dynamic programming problem with one state variable, and characterize the optimal contract with an ordinary differential equation. In the benchmark case of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) without learning, the optimal effort is constant, and the optimal contract is linear. In contrast, in our model with endogenous learning, the optimal effort policy becomes history dependent, and decreases over time on average. Moreover, we show that the optimal contract exhibits an option-like feature in that the incentives rise after good performance shocks.
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dge, nep-hrm and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning (2017) 
Working Paper: Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed012:221
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