Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment

Luigi Iovino and Mikhail Golosov

No 1020, 2013 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study the problem of optimal social insurance when agents are privately informed and the government cannot commit to a particular allocation. Contrary to the previous literature, we assume that agents' types have some persistence. We show that under some conditions it is optimal for the agents to partly misreport their types to the government. By revealing only part of their information, the agents lower the incentive for the government to deviate on its past promises.

Date: 2013
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Related works:
Journal Article: Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment (2021)
Working Paper: Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment (2019)
Working Paper: Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment (2014)
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