Campaign Finance in U.S. House Elections

Kei Kawai ()

No 1158, 2013 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper models the dynamics of fundraising, campagin spending, and accumulation of war chest in the context of U.S. House elections. We structurally estimate the model using campaign finance data and vote share data from 1984 to 2004. A salient feature of U.S. Congressional Elections is that any campaign money that was not used in previous elections can be carried over to the next election with possible deterrence effects. In our counterfactual experiment, we analyze the effect of publicly financing challenger campaigns which is designed to create a more level playing field. We find, however, that the intended effect of such campaign finance reforms are often off-set by increased spending of incumbents.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2013/paper_1158.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed013:1158

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2013 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().