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Efficient Entry in Competitive Search with Nonrival Meetings and Asymmetric Information

James Albrecht ()

No 602, 2013 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: In this paper, we consider the efficiency of entry in a model of competitive search. By "competitive search" we mean that we analyze a large market in which buyers (or sellers) can direct their search based on the terms of trade that are posted (with commitment) by their counterparts on the other side of the market. We consider in particular entry on the side of the market on which the terms of trade are advertised. We generalize this literature on efficiency entry on competitive search in two directions. First, we allow for many-on-one meetings; e.g., a seller may interact with two or more buyers at the same time. Second, we allow for asymmetric information; e.g., a seller may not know how much the buyers she is interacting with value her good.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-dge
Date: 2013
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