Signaling to Experts

Florian Scheuer and Pablo Kurlat ()

No 501, 2016 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study an otherwise standard education signaling economy with one additional feature: some of the potential employers can (imperfectly) observe workers' types directly. We propose a definition of competitive equilibrium for such an economy. The separating allocation is an equilibrium, in which employer's direct observation is irrelevant. However, there is another equilibrium where more informed employers hire high type workers with no education and pay lower wagers.

Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Signalling to Experts (2021)
Working Paper: Signaling to Experts (2017)
Working Paper: Signaling to Experts (2017)
Working Paper: Signaling to Experts (2017)
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