Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance

Pieter Gautier

No 188, 2017 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Identifying policy-relevant treatment effects from randomized experiments requires no spillovers between participants and nonparticipants (SUTVA) or variation in treatment levels. We find that SUTVA is violated for a Danish activation program for unemployed workers. Using a difference-in-difference model we show that the nonparticipants in the experiment regions find jobs slower after the introduction of the activation program (relative to workers in other regions). We then estimate an equilibrium search model. This model shows that a large-scale roll out of the activation program decreases welfare, while a standard partial microeconometric cost-benefit analysis concludes the opposite.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance (2015)
Working Paper: Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance (2012)
Working Paper: Estimating equilibrium effects of job search assistance (2012)
Working Paper: Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed017:188

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