Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection
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Vladimir Asriyan: CREi, UPF, and Barcelona GSE
No 988, 2017 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
How eﬀectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dis-persed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting, in which sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. We ﬁrst characterize equilibria with an arbitrary (but ﬁnite) number of informed sellers. A common feature is that each seller’s trading behavior provides an informative and con-ditionally independent signal about the aggregate state. We then ask whether the state is revealed as the number of informed sellers goes to inﬁnity. Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. We provide conditions under which the amount of information revealed is necessarily bounded and does not reveal the aggregate state. When these conditions are violated, there may be coexistence of equilibria that lead to full revelation with those that do not. We discuss the implications for policies meant to enhance information dissemination in markets.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-dge and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed017:988
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