EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Security Design in Opaque Markets: The Role of Exclusivity and Commitment

Victoria Vanasco ()

No 238, 2018 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study the problem of a seller with private information about her asset quality who can design securities backed by her asset cashflows to raise funds from investors in non-exclusive markets. When markets are non-exclusive, bilateral contracts between the seller and a particular investor cannot be made contingent on the contracts traded with other investors. This feature is natural in an opaque marketplace or in a dynamic environment where commitment is limited. We show that in such an environment full separation of seller types cannot be obtained. In any equilibrium, all seller types issue the same debt contract. While high-quality types retain the remaining cashflows on their balance sheet, low-quality sellers tranche their cash flows and sell the debt contract (senior tranche) and the remaining cashflows (junior tranche) separately to different investors. The model can rationalize the practice of tranching securities, and it generates new empirical predictions on the relation between the types of securities sold in markets and the quality of their underlying assets.

Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2018/paper_238.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed018:238

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2018 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:red:sed018:238