Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled
Serena Rhee and
Additional contact information
Naoki Aizawa: University of Minnesota
No 359, 2018 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
This paper studies how to optimally design subsidies for disabled workers, accounting for both the worker- and firm-side responses in the labor market. We first provide empirical evidence that firms design job characteristics, such as the flexibility of work hours, to screen out disabled workers. Then, we develop an equilibrium labor market model where firms post a screening contract which consists of wage and job characteristics; and workers with different levels of disability make labor supply decisions. We estimate the model using the Health and Retirement Study data, and identify the key model parameters by exploiting the exogenous policy variation on employment (hiring) subsidies for the disabled. Using the estimated model, we quantify the policy impacts on workers’ labor supply and firms’ employment contract design. Then, we characterize the optimal mix of the disability insurance and employment (hiring) subsidies for the disabled and study their implications on equilibrium labor market outcomes for workers of different health statuses.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled (2020)
Working Paper: Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed018:359
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in 2018 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().