To Bribe or Not to Bribe: Incentives to Protect Tanzania’s Forests

Elizabeth Robinson () and Razack B. Lokina

RFF Working Paper Series from Resources for the Future

Abstract: Where participatory forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, “volunteer†patrollers take responsibility for enforcing access restrictions, often receiving a share of the fine revenue that they collect as an incentive. We explored how this shared revenue and alternative sources of forest products for villagers determine the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe from illegal harvesters rather than honestly reporting the illegal activity. Using an optimal enforcement model, we show that, without transparency or funds to pay and monitor the volunteers undertaking enforcement, policymakers face tradeoffs between efficiency, enforcement effectiveness, and revenue collection.

Keywords: optimal enforcement; participatory forest management; Tanzania (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 Q23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-21
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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