On Social Sanctions and Beliefs: A Pollution Norm Example

Jorge García and Jiegen Wei

RFF Working Paper Series from Resources for the Future

Abstract: A prevailing view in the literature is that social sanctions can support, in equilibrium, high levels of obedience to a costly norm. The reason is that social disapproval and stigmatization faced by the disobedient are highest when disobedience is the exception rather than the rule in society. In contrast, the (Bayesian) model introduced here shows that imperfect information causes the expected social sanction to be lowest precisely when obedience is more common. This, amongst other fi?ndings, draws a distinct line between social and moral sanctions, both of which may depend on others' ?behavior but not on action observability.

Keywords: social interactions; social norms; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K42 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-mic, nep-res and nep-soc
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