The Legal and Economic Case for an Auction Reserve Price in the EU Emissions Trading System

Leonie Reins, Carolyn Fischer, Dallas Burtraw, David Langlet, Åsa Löfgren, Michael Mehling, Stefan Weishaar, Lars Zetterberg, Harro van Asselt and Kati Kulovesi

No 19-23, RFF Working Paper Series from Resources for the Future

Abstract: The EU ETS has implemented a variety of reforms to attempt to boost market prices, but have resisted a minimum auction price.Opponents to implementing a price floor argue it would interfere with the market and be tantamount to a tax.This analysis shows that a minimum auction price is a component of good program design.A minimum auction price is necessary to accommodate the portfolio of overlapping energy and climate policies.Legal analysis finds a minimum auction price would not be a fiscal instrument (tax) and would not affect Member State’s energy choices.

Date: 2019-12-16
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Working Paper: The Legal and Economic Case for an Auction Reserve Price in the EU Emissions Trading System (2019)
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