TheÂ DilemmaÂ ofÂ DelegatingÂ Search: BudgetingÂ inÂ PublicÂ EmploymentÂ Service
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher and
ThomasÂ Kuhn ()
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ThomasÂ Kuhn: DepartmentÂ ofÂ Economics,Â ChemnitzÂ UniversityÂ ofÂ Technology,Â Chemnitz,Â Germany
Professional Reports from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis
The Recent German research has suggested that extending the number of caseworkers may have a very positive effect on PES performance. The present paper accepts this key insight but argues that there are other factors that may independently drive outcomes and in particular local agentsâ€™ discretion. That is, it focuses on the delegation problem between the central office and the local job center â€˜matchmakers.â€™ Because their (search) effort in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for increased levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.
Keywords: matching unemployment; public employment service; active labor market policy; Â moralÂ hazard; Â searchÂ theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-ltv
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimpre:02_11
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