EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cournot Competition and "Green" Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship

Luca Lambertini (), Joanna Poyago-Theotoky and Alessandro Tampieri ()

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D aims to reduce emissions ("green" innovation). We present an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in "green" R&D. When environmental taxation is exogenous, aggregate R&D investment always increases with the number of firms in the industry. Next we analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a regulator (committed or time-consistent) with the aim to maximize social welfare. We show that an inverted-U relationship exists between aggregate R&D and industry size under reasonable conditions, and is driven by the presence of R&D spillovers.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ino and nep-res
Date: 2015-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.rcea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp15-21.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cournot competition and “green” innovation: An inverted-U relationship (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Cournot Competition and "Green" Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Cournot Competition and “Green” Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Cournot Competition and "Green" Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:15-21

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marco Savioli ().

 
Page updated 2018-11-24
Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:15-21