On Prices' Cyclical Behaviour in Oligopolistic Markets

Luca Lambertini () and Luigi Marattin ()
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Luigi Marattin: Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: We revisit the discussion about the relationship between price's cyclical features, implicit collusion and the demand level in an oligopoly supergame where a positive shock may hit demand and disrupt collusion. The novel feature of our model consists in characterising the post-shock noncooperative price and comparing it against the cartel price played in the last period of the collusive path, to single out the conditions for procyclicality to arise both in the short and in the long-run.

Keywords: demand shocks; cyclical pricing; implicit collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 E60 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mac
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http://www.rcea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp16-17.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: On prices’ cyclical behaviour in oligopolistic markets (2021)
Working Paper: On Prices' Cyclical Behaviour in Oligopolistic Markets (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:16-17

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