Optimal Manipulation Rules in a Mixed Duopoly
Alessandra Chirco () and
Marcella Scrimitore ()
Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis
We study the optimal manipulation rules of a public firm's objective function in a mixed duopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way in which they are affected by the degree of product substitutability. This allows us to show that partial privatization, strategic delegation and other specific government's commitments on the objective function of the public management can be looked at as special cases of these optimal rules, and to evaluate the viability of these policies under the two modes of competition. In this framework, we also discuss the equivalence between manipulation of the objective function and Stackelberg leadership.
Keywords: Mixed oligopoly; strategic manipulation; partial privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:43_11
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