Regionalism Cycle in Asia (-Pacific): A Game Theory Approach to the Rise and Fall of Asian Regional Institutions

Shintaro Hamanaka ()
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Shintaro Hamanaka: Asian Development Bank, Postal: 6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, Philippines

No 42, Working Papers on Regional Economic Integration from Asian Development Bank

Abstract: Despite a commonplace view that Asian regionalism lacks institutions, Asia, in fact, is full of regional institutions and frameworks in various forms. The rise and fall of regional institutions in Asia is an extremely dynamic process. Using a game theory approach, this paper hypothesizes that the dynamic nature of Asian regionalism can be explained by a "regionalism cycle." The institutional outcome of regionalism in Asia has been cyclical because the game played by Japan and the United States does not have a stable equilibrium. This paper tests the hypothesized regionalism cycle using actual cases of regional institutions in the field of financial cooperation and regional summit meetings.

Keywords: regionalism; Regionalism cycle; Asian Monetary Fund (AMF); East Asia Summit (EAS); Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 F36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:adbrei:0042

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