Relational goods, private consumption and social poverty traps in an evolutionary game
Paolo Russu () and
Paolo Vanin ()
No 25-2005, AICCON Working Papers from Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit
We investigate how the patterns of consumption and accumulation, as well as the patterns of time allocation and of social interaction, may be influenced by social pressure, i.e., by the choices of others. We display an evolutionary model involving several generations of interacting individuals,in which different patterns may coexist in equilibrium and in which path dependence and critical mass effects play an important role. Bomze's (1983) classification is used to study the properties of this game. We find that social pressure may lead to low welfare traps' with overwork and overconsumption, and that policy may have a role as a coordination device
Keywords: Social interaction; Relational goods; Coordination failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 D62 E21 J22 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aiccon.it/file/convdoc/n.25.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.aiccon.it/file/convdoc/n.25.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.aiccon.it/file/convdoc/n.25.pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:aiccon:2005_025
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in AICCON Working Papers from Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paolo Venturi ().