Don't Be Ashamed to Say You Didn't Get Much

Leonardo Becchetti and Vittorio Pelligra

No 88-2011, AICCON Working Papers from Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit

Abstract: We run a modified dictator game experiment to investigate the determinants of donation choices to philanthropic organizations. We find experimentally that the adoption of a simple form of accountability such as the disclosure of information on the ranking of aggregate contributions received by the organizations has important redistributive effects on donations, leading donors to reallocate significantly their giving from top to bottom performers. Our findings support the hypothesis that individuals have preferences on total donations and their ideal distribution and not just on their own giving. Policy consequences of our findings in terms of public and private contribution disclosure rules are discussed.

Keywords: altruism; strategic information; charitable-giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2011-05-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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