The political economy of the vote with the wallet

Leonardo Becchetti and Francesco Salustri

No 146-2016, AICCON Working Papers from Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit

Abstract: The willingness to pay of private consumers for socially and environmentally re- sponsible companies retailing public goods is an emerging though under-researched contemporary economic feature. We model the problem faced by responsible con- sumers as a typical multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma and analyse four redistribution mechanisms that can be implemented by regulators and institutions to enforce the cooperative equilibrium. The desirable property of three of these schemes is that of extending the parametric interval of cooperative equilibrium without additional government expenditure. We also discuss the implication of our results for already implemented policies such as feed-in tariffs (FITs).

Keywords: Redistributionmechanism; Corporatesocialresponsibility; Multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2016-04-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:aiccon:2016_146

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