Search of Prior Art and Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants

Corinne Langinier and Philippe Marcoul ()

No 2009-21, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the strategic non-revelation of information by patent applicants. In a model of a bilateral search of information, we show that patent applicants may conceal information, and that examiners make their screening intensity contingent upon the received information. We then analyze the effects of a double review policy and a policy in which examiners ex ante commit to screening efforts. The implementation of the former policy reduces strategic non-revelation, but its overall implication remains unclear. The latter policy involves equal screening intensity across all applications, requires a limited commitment power and induces truthful revelation.

Keywords: patents; information; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2009-05-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Search of Prior Art and the Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2009_021

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