Do Gamblers Think That Teams Tank? Evidence from the NBA

Brian Soebbing and Brad Humphreys

No 2010-13, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Abstract: A growing body of literature indicates that sports teams face incentives to lose games at the end of the season. This incentive arises from league entry draft policy. We use data from betting markets to confirm the existence of tanking, or the perception of tanking, in the NBA. Results from a SUR model of point spreads and point differences in NBA games indicate that betting markets believe that tanking takes place in the NBA, even though the evidence that tanking actually exists is mixed. NBA policy changes also affect betting market outcomes.

Keywords: incentives; betting markets; tanking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D49 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2010-08-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: DO GAMBLERS THINK THAT TEAMS TANK? EVIDENCE FROM THE NBA (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2010_013

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