An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

Andrew Eckert, Tilman Klumpp () and Xuejuan Su

No 2016-13, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms' investment levels, relative size, and profi tability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing rm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a rm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well-known antitrust cases.

Keywords: Monopolization; antitrust; multiple equilibria; indeterminacy; firm behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 K20 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2016-08-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2016_013

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