La mesure empirique des problèmes d'information

Georges Dionne ()

No 98-16, Working Papers from HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management

Abstract: We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetrical information problems on resource allocation. Two problems are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection. One conclusion, shared by many authors, is that information problems introduce significant distortions in the economy. However, we can verify, in different markets, that efficient mechanisms have been introduced in order to reduce these distortions and even eliminate, at the margin, some residual information problems. This conclusion is stronger for adverse selection. One explanation is that adverse selection is related to exogenous characteristics while moral hazard is due to endogenous actions that may change at any point in time.

Keywords: Mesure empirique; problème d’information; test statistique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1998-12-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information (1998)
Working Paper: La mesure empirique des problèmes d'information (1998)
Working Paper: La mesure empirique des problemes d'information (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:crcrmw:1998_016

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