The Role of Frictions on Academic Recruitment System
Luigi Bonaventura
No 2011/2, DEMQ Working Paper Series from University of Catania, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods
Abstract:
In a matching model of the academic labour market, with high-skilled (brain) and low-skilled (local) workers, this paper shows that brain workers are harmed by the local. This depends on two types of search frictions: information and cooptation frictions. Search frictions reduce the probability to get an academic job for brain workers compared to the local. A high level of cooptation discards the brain workers but, under certain conditions, the absence of cooptation does not decreases the possibility to get an academic job for the local workers. Whithin this framework, some explanations about the low probability to catch the brains and the obstacles for a e ective equal opportunity between local and outside candidates are discussed.
Keywords: academic labour market; search frictions; cooptation; recruitment system. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 J45 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2011-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-lab
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