 대북제재의 게임이론적 접근과 북한경제에 미치는 영향(Economic Sanctions against North Korea: Theory and Evidence)Youngseok Park (),
Munsu Kang (),
Wonho Yeon (),
Bumhwan Kim () and
Halin Han ()
No 21-26, Policy Analyses from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy Abstract: 본 연구는 북한의 정치체제를 정치경제학 이론적으로 정의 및 분석하고, 이를 바탕으로 대북제재에 관한 게임이론 모형을 설정하여 제시한다. 이어서 북한의 정치체제에 대한 정의와 대북제재에 관한 게임이론 모형을 바탕으로 대북제재가 북한경제에 미치는 효과를 위성 야간조도 데이터를 활용하여 분석한다. The United Nations Security Council adopted eight resolutions from 2012 to 2019, in response to the threats posed by North Korea’s tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. In this study, we first theoretically define North Korea’s political system, and then develop a dynamic game of sanctions against North Korea. Second, using satellite nighttime lights data, we empirically investigate how the ruler (regime) allocates the country’s resources to stay in power as sanctions intensify. The political system of North Korea is defined as a suryong dictatorship, in which the dictator (supreme leader, or suryong) has the absolute power to dictate the country’s resources, including its people. The theoretical definition of the North Korean political system is based on De Mesquita et al. (2005)’s selectorate theory. In light of the selectorate theory, the North Korean regime successfully divides the country’s residents into two segregated groups, the selectorate (elites) and the non-selectorate. The North Korean regime strictly restricts migration within the country, and takes special care of the capital city, Pyongyang. The regime selectively grants the right to reside in Pyongyang. Moreover, it is well known that the regime prioritizes Pyongyang citizens’ welfare and allocates resources to them first and foremost. Acemoglu et al. (2004) define kleptocracy as a political system where the state is controlled and run for the benefit of an individual, or a small group, who use their power to transfer a large fraction of the society’s resources to themselves. They suggest the divide-and-rule strategy as a method that kleptocratic rulers use to stay in power. The divide-and-rule strategy makes it difficult for residents to obtain enough social coordination for revolution against the kleptocratic ruler. On the basis of the evidence and data, we define North Korea’s suryong dictatorship as a kleptocracy. We present a game-theoretical model (a dynamic game) of sanctions on kleptocracy. The kleptocratic ruler stays in power by taxing divided groups of citizens and redistributing the revenues. (the rest omitted) Keywords: 북한경제; 국제안보; North Korean Economy; International Security (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:kieppa:2021_026 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Policy Analyses from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy [30147] 3rd Floor Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si, Korea. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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