A contest success function for rankings

Alberto Vesperoni ()

No 8/2013, NEPS Working Papers from Network of European Peace Scientists

Abstract: A contest is a game where several players compete for winning prizes by expending costly efforts. We assume that the outcome of a contest is an ordered partition of the set of players (a ranking) and a contest success function assigns a probability to each possible outcome as a function of players’ efforts. We define a contest success function for contests whose outcome is a ranking of any type, i.e., with any number of players at each rank. This approach is new in contest theory since the axiomatic work has exclusively been on contests with single-winner, whose outcome is a ranking with one player in the first rank and all other players in the second rank. The contest success function is characterized by pair-swap consistency, which is an axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives and generalizes the main axiom in Skaperdas (1996).

Keywords: conflict; contest; ranking; success function; axiom; probabilistic choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 C70 D72 D74 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2013-11-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Journal Article: A contest success function for rankings (2016)
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